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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BEATRICE N. THOMAS, : 
Plaintiff, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
vs. : 
DAVID L. MIDGLEY, MELANIE : Case No. 920446-CA 
MIDGLEY, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
JURISDICTION AND PETITION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). Appellant 
petitions this Court for rehearing under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE PETITION AND RELEVANT FACTS 
I. Statement of the Petition 
1. This is a petition for rehearing from the Memorandum 
Decision entered by this Court on January 13, 1993. (See Addendum) 
2. This petition originates from an appeal from a final 
Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (See R. 157-59) 
3. The final Order and Judgment was entered on February 13, 
1991 after a trial to the bench to the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. 
(See R. 157-59) 
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4. The Findings of Fact upon which the final Judgment is 
based were also entered by the trial court below on February 13, 
1991. (See R. 146-56) 
5. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third Judicial 
District Court on the 14th day of March, 1991. (See R. 160) 
II. Statement of the Relevant Facts 
This petition incorporates by reference the "Statement of the 
Releveant Facts" contained in Appellant's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF PETITION 
The Court erred in its Memorandum Decision by stating that 
Appellant does not appeal from the trial court's decision as to the 
$10,150 promissory note. The Court goes on to state that it need 
not address the issue relating to whether the trial court correctly 
allowed Melanie Midgley to assert the affirmative defense of the 
statute of limitations on behalf of David Midgley. 
The trial court found that the above mentioned $10,150 
promissory note was valid and enforceable. The trial court, 
however, denied the recovery against either David or Melanie 
Midgley of any payments that were due more than six years before 
the filing of the complaint. The trial court found that the 
statute of limitations pled by only Melanie Midgley barred any 
recovery against her and also David Midgley who did not plead the 
defense. 
Ms. Thomas appealed this decision and the determination that 
David Midgley, a different defendant, be protected by the statute 
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of limitation defense pled by another defendant when he did not 
plead said affirmative defense. It is the Appellant's position 
that being an affirmative defense, each party must plead the 
defense on their own behalf. If the party fails or chooses not to 
plead the defense, as in this case, they are not entitled to the 
protection of such defense. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations does not bar recovery 
for any installment payment due within the six year statute of 
limitations period with respect to Melanie Midgley. Simply stated, 
the statute of limitation defense protection should not be given to 
David Midgley due to the fact that he did not plead that defense. 
This Court must address this issue on rehearing and make a 
determination as to the statute of limitation defense as it applies 
to David Midgley and the $10,150 promissory note. 
The Court erred in ruling that no consideration was given for 
the $20,000 promissory note signed by David Midgley. Furthermore, 
this Court and the trial court failed to address in their decisions 
the fact that the Midgleys wrote off the $20,000 on their joint tax 
returns indicating that a transfer had taken place. 
The shares of stock that were given in exchange for the note 
may not have met all the formalities for transfer, but there was a 
meeting of the minds as to the transfer and each party acted as if 
the exchange was valid. David Midgley received benefits from the 
possession and "ownership" of the stock by writing off $20,000 on 
the joint tax returns filed by him and the Melanie Midgley over the 
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next seven years. There was consideration given for the note and 
benefits claimed and realized by the Midgleys from such transfer. 
This Court failed to address the trial court's ruling that the 
$20,000 note's optional acceleration clause was deemed to have been 
exercised. The trial court's decision is clearly an error of law 
and must be reversed. For an optional acceleration clause to be 
activated, the holder of such note must make an affirmative act 
before such clause will take effect. The trial court found that no 
such act was taken in this case. Nevertheless, the trial court 
found that since the Ms. Thomas had the right to accelerate said 
note, she was deemed to have accelerated the note and the statute 
of limitations barred recovery against both David Midgley and 
Melanie Midgley. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DAVID MIDGLEY RECEIVED CONSIDERATION FOR THE $20,000 
PROMISSORY NOTE AND ACCOMPANYING MORTGAGE. 
The trial court, at the end of the Plaintiff's case in chief 
ruled that the $20,000 promissory note was unenforceable against 
David Midgley because the statute of limitations had expired. (The 
petitioner addresses the issues surrounding this portion of the 
decision in Section II of this petition). At the completion of the 
trial, the trial court additionally found that the $20,000 note was 
unenforceable as against David Midgley because there was "no 
consideration for the promissory note since there was no legally 
effective assignment and/or delivery of the stock in Land 0' 
Harvest Corporation by [Ms. Thomas] to the [Midgleys]." This Court 
upheld this ruling even though the overwhelming evidence presented 
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at trial and surrounding circumstances indicate that consideration 
was given, particularly by David Midgley. 
Mrs. Thomas invested $20,000 in Land 0' Harvest, a corporation 
of which David and Melanie Midgley were both principals, for which 
she received 200 shares of said corporation. (See R. 147) Mrs. 
Thomas and the Midgleys subsequently met with an attorney, Mr. Kent 
Larsen, to discuss a way to protect Mrs. Thomas' interest. (See 
R.147) A preliminary agreement was reached by which Ms. Thomas 
would assign all of her shares (200) of Land 0f Harvest to David 
and Melanie Midgley in exchange for a promissory note together with 
a mortgage on the home of the Midgleys to secure the note. (See R. 
147) 
An assignment agreement was prepared together with a 
promissory note and a mortgage. (See R. 148) Ms. Thomas gave the 
stock certificate to the Midgleys. (T. 260-61; 274) Even though 
the Midgleys had possession of the certificate, due to an 
oversight, the stock certificate was never endorsed by Mrs. Thomas. 
David Midgley testified that he signed both the promissory note and 
the mortgage. (T. 243; 256; Exhibit #27) Melanie Midgley Short 
testified that she signed the mortgage which was used to secure the 
promissory note. (T. 142; Exhibit #4) The mortgage was properly 
recorded with the Salt Lake County recorder. (T. 16-17; 258-263) 
The trial court stated that the promissory note was valid 
against David Midgley and a cause of action arose upon the first 
defaulted interest payment. (R. 104) David Midgley knew of the 
exchange of the promissory note for the assignment of stock. It is 
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clear as to the intent of the parties for making such an exchange. 
David Midgley benefitted from this assignment by believing and 
acting as though he owned the stock. Notably, he deducted, as 
losses, on their joint tax returns, the value of the stock. (See R. 
30; Exhibit #12; T. 265-70; 155-56) 
David Midgley answered the Complaint and Crossclaim indicating 
that the transaction had taken place and he and Melanie Midgley 
received benefit. (See R. 30) David Midgley later testified and it 
is clearly represented in the tax returns that the stocks were 
written off as business losses by both David and Melanie Midgley. 
(T. 267-70) 
Along the same line of reasoning, Mrs. Thomas, acting upon the 
presumption that the assignment was valid, was not able to do the 
same. She forfeited her legal right of being able to write off the 
losses of stock from her tax returns. 
Melanie Midgley claims that there is collusion or potential 
collusion regarding these transactions between Ms. Thomas and David 
Midgley because of their divorce. This is clearly not the case due 
to the fact that all of these transactions occurred while David 
Midgley and Melanie Midgley were still married. The transaction 
was made and the stocks were being written off on their joint tax 
returns over a period of time exceeding seven years before their 
divorce. Such a contention is used only to confuse the true issues 
surrounding this case. 
In further support of Mrs. Thomas' contention, even if the 
trial court were to find that there was no formal assignment and/or 
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delivery, through the meeting of the minds and performance on the 
part of both parties, a binding contract was formed. It has been 
held that a contract, although not enforceable, may nevertheless 
become valid and binding to the extent that it has been performed; 
and after a contract has been executed on both sides the question 
of consideration becomes immaterial. 17 C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 71. 
By looking at the actions of all the parties involved, it is 
clear that even though there may have existed some technical 
problems, the intent and understanding of the parties is clear. At 
a minimum, both David Midgley and Mrs. Thomas intended for such 
transfers to occur and proceeded to act as if such had occurred. 
Both parties acknowledge that the transaction occurred. (See R. 
30, T. 16-17; 247; 256; 286-87) David Midgley did receive 
possession of the stock. (T. 260-61; 274) Thereafter, he wrote off 
their value of $20,000 as losses on their joint tax return. (See R. 
30; T. 265-70; 155-56) To hold that no transfer occurred would not 
only allow the Midgleys to receive the benefit of writing off the 
losses for the stock on the joint tax returns, but would as well 
relieve David from the note and David and Melanie from the mortgage 
signed to secure. This would put them into a can't lose situation 
and Mrs. Thomas into a can't win situation. 
For a contract to be valid, there must be consideration given 
by both parties. At every stage of the relationship between Mrs. 
Thomas and the Midgleys, consideration was given by both parties. 
It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Thomas made an initial investment of 
$20,000 for which she received 200 shares of stock. 
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Mrs. Thomas then gave her 200 shares of stock to David Midgley 
for which she received a promissory note and a mortgage to secure 
such note. (T. 260-61; 274) Both Mrs. Thomas and David Midgley 
testified that this assignment was made to the Midgleys. (T. 16-17; 
258-263) Benefits were conferred to both parties in each of these 
transactions. 
The trial court in this matter decided that in the second 
transfer, the assignment of stock in exchange for the note and 
mortgage, was invalid due to lack of delivery and no consideration 
given. The trial court ignored the uncontroverted evidence and 
errored in finding as such. 
The Court failed to correctly find that even though defects 
may have been present in the assignment and/or delivery of stock, 
the clear intent and performance by David Midgley and Ms. Thomas 
would correct the defects creating a valid transfer by which they 
should be bound. To hold otherwise would violate the equitable 
powers that the Court possesses. 
Therefore, the promissory note signed by David Midgley and the 
mortgage signed by David and Melanie Midgley are valid and Ms. 
Thomas should be entitled to enforce them in order to satisfy the 
debt owed. 
II. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN INSTALLMENT PAYMENT ON A PROMISSORY 
NOTE CONTAINING AN OPTIONAL ACCELERATION CLAUSE ARISES WHEN 
THE INSTALLMENT IS NOT PAID. AN OPTIONAL ACCELERATION CLAUSE 
WILL NOT SELF-EXECUTE AND MUST BE ACTIVATED BY AN AFFIRMATIVE 
ACT ON THE PART OF THE HOLDER. 
This Court did not address this issue in its decision due to 
the fact that it dismissed Appellants claim to the $20,000 note due 
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to "failure of consideration". The Court on rehearing must address 
this issue due to the following considerations. 
The trial court initially ruled against Ms. Thomas in its 
enforcement of the $20,000 note against David Midgley because the 
Court determined that the optional acceleration clause contained in 
the note was "deemed" to have been exercised by Ms. Thomas. The 
finding was made despite that fact that Ms. Thomas made no attempt 
whatsoever to exercise this acceleration clause. Making such a 
finding, and applying the statute of limitations defense pled by 
another defendant in the action to David Midgley, the trial court 
ruled after the Plaintiff's case in chief that the $20,000 note was 
therefore unenforceable against David Midgley by reason of the 
statute of limitations. 
At the completion of the trial, the trial additionally found 
that the $20,000 note was unenforceable as against David Midgley 
because there was a failure of consideration. However, as was 
analyzed in the Section I of this Petition, there is no "failure of 
consideration" for the $20,000 promissory note signed by David 
Midgley as in pertains to David Midgley. 
As such, the Court must address the issue presented in the 
original Appellant's Brief relating to the trial court's 
interpretation of "optional" acceleration clause and the trial 
court's determination that the acceleration clause was "deemed" to 
have been exercised. 
The Petitioner requests that the Court review the Section I of 
the Appellant's Brief as it analyzes in detail this issue. 
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However, the Petitioner will provide a brief summary in this 
Petition. 
The $20,000 promissory note contained an acceleration clause 
which in part stated: 
"If the holder deems herself insecure or if default be 
made in payment of the whole or any part of any 
installment at the time when or place where the same 
becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire 
unpaid balance with interest as afforded, shall, at the 
election of the holder and without notice of said 
election, at once become due and payable..." (emphasis 
added) (Exhibit #27). 
This type of clause is known as an "optional" acceleration clause. 
These clauses were created for the benefit of the holder of the 
note and provides the holder with the opportunity, if she so 
desires, to accelerate the note making it due and payable 
immediately. However, if the holder does nothing and/or has no 
desire to accelerate the note, the clause remains dormant and the 
note is treated as a normal installment note with periodic payment 
due dates. 
The trial court, however, wrongly interpreted that this 
clause, without any act by Ms. Thomas, accelerated the entire note 
due and payable upon the first default (cause of action) on August 
18, 1978. In so doing, the trial court further erroneously held 
that the six year Statute of Limitations (78-12-23 Utah Code 
annotated) which bars recovery for any "cause of action" on a 
written obligation was applicable to the entire accelerated note. 
The trial court's determination that the acceleration clause 
found in the promissory note signed by David Midgley automatically 
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matured the entire obligation upon the default of the first payment 
was incorrect and must be reversed. 
In light of the existing facts and applicable case law as set 
forth in Appellant1s Brief, the acceleration clause embodied in the 
promissory note held by Mrs. Thomas was clearly optional. Because 
Mrs. Thomas did not elect to exercise her option, the note was not 
accelerated. The failure to make an installment payment is a cause 
of action which triggers an individual statute of limitations as to 
the past due installments. Therefore, Ms. Thomas is barred from 
recovering only those annual interest installment payments whose 
individual statute of limitations have run. All other installment 
payments do not violate the statute of limitations and Mrs. Thomas 
is entitled to those payments. Further, as is in the contention of 
Ms. Thomas, the statute of limitations' defense should not be 
applied to David Midgley's obligations. (See below for analysis) 
III. THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE WHICH MUST BE PLED BY THE DEFENDANT CLAIMING SUCH AS 
A DEFENSE OR SUCH DEFENSE IS DEEMED WAIVED. 
This Court failed to address this issue in its Memorandum 
Decision. The Court indicated that the Appellant did not appeal 
from the portion of the judgment relating to the $10,150 promissory 
note. This is not the case. Ms. Thomas did appeal this portion of 
the judgment arguing that the trial court erroneously applied the 
statute of limitations defense to David Midgley. Such an 
application of affirmative defense to a defendant who did not plead 
the same is erroneous. Ms. Thomas did appeal this issue in the 
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Appellant's Brief and this Court must address this issue on 
rehearing. 
Once again, please review Section II of Appellant's Brief 
where this issue is analyzed in more detail. However, excerpts 
from the Appellant's Brief are provided here in this Petition in 
summary form. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that the defense of 
statute of limitations is classified as an affirmative defense. As 
such, the Rules require that these affirmative defenses must be set 
forth "in pleading to a preceding pleading." (URCP 8(c)). The 
Rules go on to state that "a party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present either by motion . . . or in 
his answer or reply." (URCP 12(h)). 
In this case, David Midgley, being separated from and acting 
independent from Melanie Midgley Short, did not plead at any time 
in his Answer (see R. 30) or by a motion the statute of limitations 
as a defense to the claims against him. Rather, he acknowledged 
that the money was owed to Ms. Thomas. Melanie Midgley, being 
separated from and acting independent from David Midgley, did raise 
in her pleadings the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. (See R. 18) 
Judge Rigtrup decided, as a matter of law, that the 
affirmative defense of statute of limitations pled by Melanie 
Midgley applied as well to David Midgley. (R. 110) After being 
questioned as to such a holding, Judge Rigtrup the next day 
acknowledged that there may be no legal basis for such a decision. 
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Addressing this issue he stated, "I reached a conclusion. Whether 
that's right or wrong, perhaps might be novel." (R. 112) 
It is well established that each defendant to an action must 
raise the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in a 
responsive pleading or it is deemed waived. David Midgley acting 
independently chose not to raise such a defense and therefore 
cannot be granted the protection of such defense by the independent 
acts of a separate defendant. The holding by the trial court that 
the statute of limitations barred recovery against David Midgley as 
to both promissory notes was in error and must be reversed. 
IV. MELANIE MIDGLEY AND DAVID MIDGLEY EXECUTED A VALID MORTGAGE 
ALLOWING THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY TO ACT AS COLLATERAL 
ON THE $20,000 NOTE SIGNED BY DAVID MIDGLEY. 
This Court states in its Memorandum Decision that Melanie 
Midgley by signing the mortgage would be an "accommodation maker" 
for the promissory note. The Court, however, ruled that the 
$20,000 promissory note was invalid because of failure of 
consideration, thus vitiating the mortgage. As was analyzed above, 
consideration was given by at a minimum David Midgley and an 
enforceable promissory note was created as between David Midgley 
and Ms. Thomas. As such, the mortgage is not vitiated, but is 
enforceable against the interests of David Midgley and Melanie 
Midgley. 
Melanie Midgley testified that she was at the meeting in Mr. 
Kent Larsen's office and understood that an assignment of stock and 
promissory note were to be drawn up. (T. 139-40; 143; 155) Melanie 
Midgley testified that she had seen the promissory note and that 
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she signed the mortgage which was used to secure the promissory 
note. (T. 142) 
For more detail regarding this issue, please review the 
analysis found in Section IV of the Appellant's brief. However, in 
summary, with this valid promissory note and the Court's correct 
determination that Melanie Midgley is an accommodator of the note, 
Ms. Thomas is therefore entitled to foreclose the mortgage which is 
collateral for the promissory note. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been discussed above, the trial court errored in 
determining that the acceleration clause contained in the $20,000 
promissory note was automatic in nature. The acceleration clause 
was in fact optional and Ms. Thomas did not elect to accelerate the 
note. The trial court errored in deeming the promissory note 
accelerated thereby extinguishing Ms. Thomas's claim due to the 
statute of limitations. This determination must be addressed and 
reversed on rehearing. 
The trial court held that the promissory note was not 
enforceable as to David Midgley because it was time barred by the 
statute of limitations. This Court, by reversing the decision as 
to the acceleration clause, would therefore reinstate the 
promissory note as to David Midgley which is secured by a valid 
mortgage signed by both David Midgley and Melanie Midgley. 
With respect to the statute of limitations affirmative 
defense, the Court must also reverse the trial court's application 
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of such a defense to David Midgley who did not assert it. There is 
no legal basis for such an application. By so doing, in 
combination with the reversal as to the optional acceleration 
clause in the $20,000 note, all of the note's annual interest 
payments plus the principle amount would be enforceable and 
recoverable against David Midgley. This reversal regarding the 
statute of limitations would also modify the trial court decision 
to bar recovery against David Midgley with respect to the $10,000 
promissory note. This would entitle Mrs. Thomas to recover the 
entire outstanding balance owed on the $10,000 promissory note 
against David Midgley. 
Nevertheless, if this Court did apply the affirmative defense 
to David Midgley and only reversed as to the optional acceleration 
clause and find consideration for the $20,000 promissory note 
between David Midgley and Ms. Thomas, Ms. Thomas would be barred 
from recovering only those annual interest payments that were due 
more than six years before the commencement of this action. 
Regardless of these two alternatives, the enforceable promissory 
note is secured by a valid mortgage signed by both David Midgley 
and Melanie Midgley. 
The Courtf s decision upholding the trial court's finding that 
the promissory note was not enforceable due to lack of assignment 
and/or delivery must be reversed. As was discussed in the brief 
and this Petition, this was an error as a matter of law. By 
reversing this finding, the promissory note would be enforceable 
against David Midgley. 
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As such, the fact remains that Melanie Midgley did sign a 
valid mortgage to secure the $20,000 promissory note. As such, the 
collateral (mortgage) which she executed to secure the note may be 
foreclosed upon to satisfy the balance owed on the note. 
Ms. Thomas is therefore entitled to enforcement of the $10,150 
promissory note and interest payments against the property and 
enforcement against Melanie Midgley for the payments which do not 
violate the six year statute of limitations defense which she pled. 
Ms. Thomas is likewise entitled to enforcement of the $20,000 
promissory note and interest payments against the property. 
This petition is hereby certified to be brought in good fail 
and not for delay and it respectfully submitted this /Jl day of 
January, 1993. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Byit*£jJt tf~~ DJjuU-
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, this day 
of January, 1993 to: 
Steven C, Tycksen 
Attorney for Respondent 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Beatrice N. Thomas, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
/ 
Melanie Midgley; David L. 
Midgley; and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants and Appellee, 
\fe' : *;oonan 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 920446-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 13, 1993) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Steven C. Tycksen, Murray, for Appellees 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant, Beatrice Thomas, appeals from a judgment entered 
after a bench trial. Thomas sued her son, David Midgley, and his 
former wife, Melanie Midgley, on two promissory notes. 
Proceedings against David were stayed by his filing of a 
bankruptcy petition. As a result, judgment was entered only as 
to the claims against Melanie, and Melanie is the sole appellee 
before us. We affirm. 
Both David and Melanie signed a promissory note in the sum 
of $10,500.00 in favor of Thomas, secured by a mortgage on their 
then jointly owned home. The note provided for monthly payments 
and contained no acceleration clause. The trial court granted 
Thomas judgment on this note for all payments which accrued 
during the six years prior to filing of her complaint, the date 
the statute of limitations expired. Thomas was also awarded a 
decree of foreclosure on the property securing the note. Thomas 
does not appeal from this portion of the judgment, nor does 
Melanie. 
A second promissory note in the principal sum of $20,000.00 
was signed by David only, but was never delivered to Thomas. 
Apparently the original plan was that Thomas would transfer stock 
to David and Melanie for the note. Both David and Melanie signed 
a mortgage securing the note. The stock was not delivered or 
endorsed by Thomas and an assignment of the stock was prepared 
but not executed. Testimony differed as to whether the 
transaction was ever completed. Melanie testified that it was 
not and that a gift was intended by Thomas. 
The trial court found Melanie was not liable on the note and 
the mortgage was not enforceable on the bases that (1) there was 
no consideration for the note; (2) the statute of limitations 
barred recovery; and/or (3) the statute of frauds barred recovery 
against Melanie. We affirm on the bases that Melanie had no 
direct liability on the note because she did not sign it, thus 
failing to comply with the statute of frauds,1 and further, that 
even if she executed the mortgage as an accommodation maker, 
there was no consideration for the note,2 thus vitiating the 
mortgage. A trial court's findings of fact must be affirmed 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). We 
will reverse only if the findings are clearly against the weight 
of evidence or we are otherwise convinced a mistake has been 
made. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1976). In particular, we 
give deference to the trial court's determinations of 
credibility. Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 473 (Utah 
App. 1988). Although the evidence concerning consideration in 
this case was disputed, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the court's conclusions that the transaction 
was not consummated, there was no meeting of the minds, and the 
court could fairly infer that Thomas intended a gift to her son. 
1. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) (Supp. 1989); Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v, Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1984). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-303 (1990). 
We need not,therefore, reach the issue of whether the court 
correctly allowed Melanie to assert the statute of limitations on 
behalf of David.3 
We affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory Orme, Judge 
3. In its findings, the trial court noted that the property 
which was to secure the $20,000.00 note was awarded to Melanie in 
the divorce proceedings; that David had filed a bankruptcy 
petition in which he sought to discharge debts to both his mother 
and Melanie; and that "the potential for collusion on the part of 
[Thomas] and [David] is obvious and unfair to [Melanie]." For 
these reasons, the court found that even though David did not 
raise the statute of limitations as a defense in his answer, 
Melanie could do so on his behalf, to protect her own interest. 
